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Abstract:	Place—what	it	means	to	be	somewhere,	or	to	be	from	somewhere—is	a	common	thread	
running	through	the	many	systemic	crises	of	our	time.	Place	is	a	value	under	threat	from	
globalisation,	gentrification,	networked	technologies,	human	conflict	and	environmental	disasters.	At	
the	same	time,	it	is	an	underlying	cause	of	some	of	the	political	and	social	tensions	that	are	
intertwined	with	these	issues.	Within	architectural	theory,	place	is	strongly	associated	with	
phenomenology,	the	foundations	of	which	are	entangled	with	the	sort	of	nativist	politics	that	is	
currently	resurgent	around	the	world.	In	this	working	paper,	I	outline	an	alternative	approach	to	
place	as	a	way	to	address	its	double-edged	quality,	building	on	Ernst	von	Glasersfeld’s	radically	
constructivist	interpretation	of	Jean	Piaget.	In	doing	so,	I	establish	points	of	connection	between	
architectural	discourse	on	place	and	the	cybernetic	foundations	of	systemic	design.	
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1. Systems	and	places	
Place—what	it	means	to	be	somewhere,	or	to	be	from	somewhere,	and	how	we	then	construct	this	
as	an	idea	and	in	built	form—is	a	common	thread	running	through	the	many	systemic	crises	of	our	
time.	Place	is	a	value	under	threat	from	globalisation,	gentrification,	migration	and	the	development	
of	networked	technologies.	Many	places	are	also	very	literally	at	risk	from	human	conflict,	climate	
change	and	ecosystem	collapse.	As	well	as	being	under	threat	from	these	systemic	crises,	place	is,	at	
the	same	time,	a	contributing	factor	to	some	of	the	political	and	social	tensions	that	are	intertwined	
with	these	issues.	This	double-edged	quality	is	becoming	ever	more	visible	around	the	world	in	the	
reinforcement	of	borders	and	in	current	tendencies	towards	ever	more	specific	units	of	political	
identity	and	nationhood.	
While	this	may	seem	somewhat	intractable,	we	can	see	some	of	this	interaction	between	systems	
and	places	within	our	everyday	experience.	During	this	conference,	several	speakers	have	spoken	
about	the	importance	of	getting	the	whole	system	into	the	room	where	decisions	are	made	(e.g.	
Jones,	2018).	We	might	also	ask,	what	systems	are	already	implicit	in	the	rooms	that	we	enter?	
During	the	presentation	of	this	paper	at	the	conference,	I	located	this	question	in	the	tiered	lecture	
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theatre	in	which	I	was	speaking.	As	Gregory	Bateson	(1972/2000,	pp.	493-494)	has	pointed	out,	
spaces	such	as	this	encourage	a	unilateral	relation	between	speaker	and	audience,	with	the	former	
standing	to	deliver	a	monologue	to	a	mostly	passive	audience	who	sit	and	listen.	This	reinforces	the	
epistemological	error	that	we	are	separate	from	each	other,	in	turn	perpetuating	the	idea	that	we	
are	separate	from	our	environment,	which	Bateson	goes	on	to	identify	as	being	at	the	root	of	the	
ecological	crisis.	That	is,	the	way	we	place	ourselves—and	each	other—in	the	world	through	the	
design	and	use	of	space	has	much	wider	systemic	ramifications.	
It	is	clear	that	place	should	be	an	important	consideration	within	systemic	design,	and	indeed	it	has	
been	an	emerging	theme	in	RSD	conferences	and	related	publications	(Ellefsen,	2017;	Ruttonsha,	
2016,	2018;	Sweeting,	2018).	Integrating	a	consideration	of	place	within	systemic	approaches	is,	
however,	far	from	straightforward.	The	strengths	of	systems	theory	and	cybernetics	come	at	the	cost	
of	abstraction.	Ross	Ashby,	for	instance,	stressed	that	“systems	theory	must	become	based	on	
methods	of	simplification”	and	that	“the	systems	theorist	of	the	future…must	be	an	expert	in	how	to	
simplify”	(Ashby,	1964/2001,	p.	594,	italics	original).	Similarly,	Ashby’s	influential	introduction	to	
cybernetics	characterised	it	as	the	study	of	“all	possible	machines”,	focusing	on	general	principles	
and	downplaying	material	embodiment	(Ashby,	1956,	pp.	1-2).	This	abstraction	is	part	of	what	gives	
systemic	approaches	their	tremendous	reach	and	transdisciplinary	potential,	but	in	so	doing	it	
distances	them	from	specific	situations	and	material	conditions.	One	way	in	which	to	counter	this	is	
by	integrating	more	situated	methods,	as	has	been	prominent	within	this	conference	series	and	the	
development	of	systemic	design	(e.g.	Aguirre	&	Paulsen,	2014;	Perera,	2018;	Sevaldson,	2017).	An	
alternative	approach,	and	the	one	I	pursue	here,	is	to	look	to	how	place	is	understood	in	
architectural	theory	and	to	develop	connections	between	this	architectural	discourse	and	the	
foundations	of	systemic	design.	
2. Place	in	architectural	phenomenology	
In	architectural	theory,	place	is	strongly	associated	with	phenomenology,	and	especially	Martin	
Heidegger’s	later	philosophy,	through	figures	such	as	Christian	Norberg-Schulz	(1971,	1980,	1986),	
Karsten	Harries	(1997),	and	Kenneth	Frampton	(1974,	1983)	amongst	others.	Although	it	is	possible	
to	draw	aspects	of	phenomenology	into	systemic	and	cybernetic	approaches	to	architecture	and	
design	in	various	ways	(e.g.	Jelić,	2015;	Ruttonsha,	2018),	there	is	little	common	ground	between	
architectural	phenomenology’s	concern	for	place	and	the	areas	of	architecture	where	systemic	
approaches	have	been	most	influential.	Indeed,	the	prominent	examples	of	Melvin	Webber	(co-
author	with	Horst	Rittel	of	the	seminal	paper	on	‘wicked	problems’	(Rittel	&	Webber,	1973))	and	
Cedric	Price	(who	collaborated	extensively	with	cybernetician	Gordon	Pask	(Sweeting,	2016b))	are	
amongst	those	cited	by	architectural	historian	Christian	Norberg-Schulz	(1986,	p.	27,	including	
footnote	7)	as	disregarding	the	importance	of	place.	
While	phenomenological	approaches	remain	influential,	they	have	been	in	retreat	within	
architectural	theory	in	recent	decades.	This	has	followed	significant	criticisms	(e.g.	Leach,	1998,	
2005):	
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• Firstly,	architectural	phenomenology	is	entangled	with	the	nativism	that	Leach	(1998)	has	
characterised	as	the	“dark	side”	of	Heidegger’s	thinking.	This	is	manifest	in	the	idea	that	
some	ways	of	dwelling	are	less	authentic	than	others	because	they	are	less	rooted	in	place.	
See	for	instance	Leach’s	(2005)	critique	of	the	all	too	sharp	contrast	that	Harries	(1997)	
constructs	between	mobile	homes	and	traditional	farmsteads.	
• Secondly,	the	regionalist	approach	that	phenomenology	helped	to	motivate	has	itself	been	
recognised	as	a	product	of	the	homogenising	global	capitalism	it	sought	to	counter	(Jameson,	
1997).		
• Thirdly,	phenomenological	accounts	of	place	have	tended	to	downplay	the	spatial	
significance	of	social,	political	and	economic	factors,	which	are	some	of	the	most	important	
aspects	of	what	is	at	stake	when	we	discuss	place	today.		
Thus,	while	architectural	phenomenology	may	have	much	to	contribute,	it	is	bound	up	with	some	of	
the	issues	that,	from	a	systemic	perspective,	are	in	need	of	being	addressed.	We	might	therefore	
look	elsewhere	to	inform	our	approach	to	place	(see	e.g.	Cumberlidge	&	Musgrave,	2007;	Gehl,	2010;	
Jacobs,	1961;	Ruttonsha,	2018).	Yet,	the	aspects	of	architectural	phenomenology	that	make	it	
problematic	also	offer	an	opportunity	for	critical	reflection,	and	this	is	my	purpose	in	continuing	to	
focus	on	it	here.	
The	work	of	Norberg-Schulz,	in	particular,	offers	a	point	of	departure	from	which	to	integrate	issues	
of	place	within	systemic	design.	The	phenomenological	framing	that	Norberg-Schulz	gives	to	his	work	
is	not	what	it	first	appears.	Although	he	is	perhaps	best	known	for	introducing	Heidegger	into	
architectural	theory,	Norberg-Schulz’s	use	of	Heidegger	tends	to	be	illustrative,	with	his	arguments	
supported	by	quotations	from	Heidegger	but	not	dependent	on	them.	As	Jorge	Otero-Pailos	(2010,	p.	
176)	has	put	it,	“Norberg-Schulz	used	Heidegger	as	a	theoretical	mask	to	add	philosophical	
credibility”	to	his	primarily	visual	argument.	Norberg-Schulz	draws	on	an	eclectic	range	of	other	
references,	including	systems	theorist	Talcott	Parsons	and	psychologist	and	epistemologist	Jean	
Piaget.	This	is	usually	presented	as	a	weakness	of	Norberg-Schulz’s	work	compared	to	more	
philosophically	sophisticated	writers	such	as	Harries,	in	that	the	ad	hoc	character	of	Norberg-Schulz’s	
theoretical	sources	presents	an	unstable	basis	for	his	position.	Yet,	this	instability	also	presents	an	
opportunity	to	rethink	place	in	different	terms,	avoiding	some	of	the	difficulties	with	which	
phenomenological	approaches	are	entangled,	while	also	bringing	architectural	and	systemic	
considerations	into	dialogue.	
3. Reformulating	place	in	radically	constructivist	terms	
Piaget	is	one	of	Norberg-Schulz’s	most	important	points	of	reference.	This	is	especially	so	in	Norberg-
Schulz’s	earlier	work,	but	continues	to	be	the	case	alongside	and	after	his	turn	towards	
phenomenology.	In	Existence,	Space	and	Architecture,	Norberg-Schulz	(1971,	pp.	9-14)	uses	Piaget’s	
concepts	of	accommodation	and	assimilation	to	set	out	an	understanding	of	space	in	terms	of	an	
interactive	relationship	between	people	and	their	surroundings.	He	contrasts	this	with	the	tendency	
of	other	treatments	of	space	to	reduce	it	to	either	abstract	geometrical	description	or	sense	
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impressions	and	feelings.	This	forms	a	foundation	to	Norberg-Schulz’s	argument,	independent	of	the	
concepts	he	draws	from	Heidegger.	
Norberg-Schulz’s	use	of	Piaget	offers	a	point	of	departure	from	which	to	understand	place	in	
constructivist	terms	and	to	bring	it	into	dialogue	with	contemporary	concerns	in	systemic	design.	This	
theoretical	reframing	is	perhaps	an	odd	thing	to	suggest.	Yet,	in	the	particular	case	of	Norberg-
Schulz,	it	is	in	keeping	with	how	he	himself	developed	his	work,	re-theorising	his	ideas	in	
combination	with	new	sources	as	he	developed	his	position.	My	purpose	is	not	to	offer	a	
reinterpretation	of	Norberg-Schulz’s	intentions,	but	to	use	his	work	to	explore	what	is	at	stake	in	how	
we	understanding	place.	
At	the	same	time	as	Norberg-Schulz’s	turn	towards	phenomenology	during	the	1970s,	Piaget’s	work	
was	the	principal	reference	for	the	development	of	radical	constructivism	by	Ernst	von	Glasersfeld	
(1974,	1982).	Radical	constructivism	critiques	the	way	conventional	approaches	to	epistemology	
focus	on	the	possibility	of	a	correspondence	between	one’s	experience	and	the	world	beyond	it.	As	
Glasersfeld	points	out,	the	question	of	such	a	correspondence	is	unresolvable	in	principle.	One	
cannot	experience	the	world	beyond	one’s	experience,	and	so	cannot	evaluate	such	a	claim.	
Glasersfeld	draws	on	Piaget’s	studies	of	how	knowledge	is	actively	built	up	in	order	to	reformulate	
the	domain	of	epistemology	to	be	concerned	with	how	we	make	sense	of	the	world	of	our	
experience.	Glasersfeld’s	approach	is	primarily	a	critique	of	realism	but	he	also	differentiates	it	from	
what	he	refers	to	as	“trivial”	forms	of	constructivism,	where	while	the	knower’s	role	is	
acknowledged,	knowledge	is	still	understood	in	terms	of	correspondence:	
From	my	perspective,	those	who	merely	speak	of	the	construction	of	knowledge,	but	do	not	
explicitly	give	up	the	notion	that	our	conceptual	constructions	can	or	should	in	some	way	
represent	an	independent,	‘objective’	reality,	are	still	caught	up	in	the	traditional	theory	of	
knowledge	that	is	defenseless	against	the	sceptics’	arguments.	From	an	epistemological	point	
of	view,	therefore,	their	constructivism	is	trivial.	Trivial	constructivism	manifests	itself	in	
professionals	who	treat	the	knowledge	of	others	as	subjective	construction	and	never	doubt	
the	‘objectivity’	of	their	own.	(Glasersfeld,	1991,	p.	17)	
There	is	some	similarity	between	the	ways	that,	in	their	respective	contexts,	Glasersfeld	and	
Norberg-Schulz	each	attempt	to	move	beyond	the	dichotomy	between	realism	and	idealism.	
However,	radical	constructivism	is	in	sharp	tension	with	Norberg-Schulz’s	view	of	place	as	an	
enduring	quality,	linked	to	landscape	and	persistent	through	social	and	economic	change.	While	
Norberg-Schulz	does	emphasise	the	active	role	of	experience,	he	sees	the	meaning	of	place	as	
something	to	be	selected	from	possibilities	already	“inherent	in	the	world”	(Norberg-Schulz,	1980,	p.	
170).	This	interpretation	can	be	characterised	as	trivial	constructivism	in	Glasersfeld’s	terms.	To	
understand	place	in	radically	constructivist	terms	is	to	see	it	as	something	that	we	are	continually	
creating	within	our	experience,	rather	than	an	already	given	that	is	to	be	discovered.	This	has	
significant	consequences	for	the	status	of	claims	about	the	character	of	a	place,	such	as	the	tendency	
of	the	phenomenological	approach	to	see	some	places	as	more	authentic	than	others.	From	a	
radically	constructivist	perspective,	place	is	as	much	a	matter	of	our	participation	as	anything	else:	
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just	because	someone	experiences	somewhere	as	placeless,	does	not	mean	that	it	will	not	be	a	
coherent	place	for	someone	else	or	at	another	time.	In	this	light,	the	way	that	Harries	(1997)	and	
Norberg-Schulz	(1980)	characterise	mobile	homes	or	suburban	developments	as	lacking	in	place	tells	
us	at	least	as	much	about	the	authors	as	about	the	places	they	are	trying	to	describe.	
To	adopt	a	radically	constructivist	approach	is	not,	however,	to	say	that	place	is	arbitrary	or	to	deny	
that	the	character	of	particular	places	can	persist	over	time	or	between	people.	Stable	and	shared	
conceptions	of	a	place	can	be	understood	as	developing	through	recursive	social	processes.	Factors	
such	as	history,	landscape,	and	the	built	environment	can	be	understood	to	act	as	constraints	on	
what	conceptions	of	place	can	be	viably	maintained	rather	than	sources	of	meaning.	Places	that	have	
particularly	strongly	defined	and	consistent	characters,	such	as	many	of	the	examples	that	Norberg-
Schulz	(1980)	focuses	on,	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	recursive	reinforcement	of	these	
constraints	through	the	ongoing	design	of	the	built	environment,	such	as	where	a	building	echoes	or	
reinterprets	its	context.	Norberg-Schulz	advocates	this	process	as	a	way	of	making	our	environments	
intelligible.	To	take	a	radically	constructivist	approach	is	not	to	dismiss	the	importance	of	this,	but	
rather	to	raise	critical	questions	about	it.	Who	do	particular	attempts	at	placemaking	serve?	Where	
architecture	contributes	to	a	sense	of	place,	whose	interpretation	is	being	reinforced?	By	
strengthening	one	reading	of	place,	which	alternatives	are	excluded	because	they	become	harder	to	
construct?	In	this	way,	a	radically	constructivist	approach	allows	for	place	to	be	differentiated	from	
the	nativism	with	which	phenomenology	is	entangled.	
4. Connecting	place	with	systemic	design	
One	of	the	weaknesses	of	architectural	phenomenology	is	that	it	has	tended	to	see	place	as	solely	a	
matter	for	spatial	disciplines	such	as	architecture	and	planning,	understanding	it	in	isolation	from	
political,	social	and	economic	factors.	By	contrast,	understanding	place	in	terms	of	radical	
constructivism	suggests	connections	with	cybernetics	and,	through	this,	with	the	framework	of	
systemic	design,	allowing	a	broader	treatment.	
Radical	constructivism	overlaps	significantly	with	cybernetics,	with	which	Piaget’s	work	has	a	number	
of	sympathies	and	connections	(Boden,	1979,	pp.	126-148;	Glanville,	2013;	Glasersfeld,	1992;	Pask,	
1976,	p.	19).	The	work	of	Ranulph	Glanville	has	understood	radical	constructivism,	cybernetics	and	
design	as	closely	interwoven	with	each	other	(Glanville,	2006,	2013,	2006/2014,	2014;	Herr,	2015).	
Glanville	is	perhaps	best	known	for	his	influential	argument	about	the	relation	of	design	and	
research:	that	rather	than	design	being	one	particular	form	of	research,	it	makes	more	sense	to	
understand	research	as	a	specific	form	of	design	activity	(Glanville,	1999,	1981/2014;	Sweeting,	
2016a).	He	later	generalised	this	argument,	drawing	on	Piaget’s	account	of	how	we	establish	the	
constancy	of	objects	across	our	different	experiences	of	them	(Glanville,	2006,	2006/2014).	Glanville	
argues	that	the	Piagetian	mechanisms	of	assimilation	and	accommodation	form	what	is,	in	effect,	a	
design	process,	creating	the	constant	objects	of	our	experience.	Design	can	therefore	be	understood	
as	an	“essential	part	of	thinking”	(2006/2014,	p.	231),	leading	to	the	conclusion	that	“to	be	human	is	
to	be	a	designer,	and	there	is	no	more	important	human	act	than	to	design”	(p.	237).		
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Combining	the	ways	in	which	Piaget’s	ideas	are	taken	up	by	Glanville	and	Norberg-Schulz,	spatial	
experience	can	be	understood	as	a	design	activity	on	the	part	of	the	experiencer.	This	supports	the	
idea	that	place	is	something	we	create	rather	than	something	we	find,	as	discussed	above,	while	also	
forefronting	the	role	of	constraints	within	this.	Consider,	for	instance,	how	place	might	be	thought	of	
in	terms	of	Schön’s	(1992,	p.	133)	well-known	characterisation	of	design	as	a	“reflective	conversation	
with	the	materials	of	the	situation”.		
Understanding	place	in	this	way	has	the	advantage	of	bringing	it	into	a	closer	relation	to	fields	that	
are	not	overtly	concerned	with	physical	spaces.	It	is	easy	to	think	of	the	design	and	experience	of	
digital	technologies,	systems	and	services	as	intangible.	Nevertheless,	they	become	manifest	in	and	
shape	our	spatial	environments,	and	are	bound	up	with	the	economic,	social	and	political	issues	that	
are	characteristic	of	contemporary	conflicts	over	place.	The	approach	that	I	have	outlined	in	this	
paper	allows	place	to	be	understood	in	similar	terms	to	these	less	tangible	factors,	providing	a	
framework	in	which	the	role	of	place	within	the	systemic	may	be	addressed.	
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